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In response to Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Tex-
tualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009). 
 
In his interesting and provocative article, The Inexorable Radicaliza-
tion of Textualism, Jonathan Siegel argues that the textualist approach 
to statutory interpretation has gone off the deep end.1  Driven largely 
by Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy,2 textualism instructs interpre-
ters of statutes to focus on the language of the statute and to reject 
certain other often-used interpretive tools, especially the legislative 
history that led to the enactment, and the purpose of the legislation.  
The former is illegitimate because it is undemocratic to aggrandize 
the unenacted words of committees or individual members who hap-
pen to have spoken up;3 the latter is illegitimate because the un-
enacted purpose of a statute cannot serve as a suitable replacement 
for the law itself, whose language is the product of a constitutionally 
mandated process.4  On the other hand, such clues as judicially 
† Don Forchelli Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Brook-
lyn Law School. 
1 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
117 (2009). 
2 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System:  The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws (arguing that legislative his-
tory should not be used as an authoritative interpretive source), in A MATTER OF IN-
TERPRETATION 3, 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
3 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2421 n.127 
(2003) (arguing that “[t]he views of legislative gatekeepers . . . are not necessarily good 
proxies for general social attitudes” or the view “of the legislature as a whole”). 
4 See Scalia, supra note 2, at 29-37 (arguing that legislative history is unhelpful be-
cause there is often no legislative intent, the intent of individual legislators is often un-
expressed, and legislative histories are often inconclusive). 
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crafted canons of construction, the stare decisis effect of earlier deci-
sions interpreting the same or related language, coherence in inter-
pretation (both within the provision and more broadly within the 
code), and certain background social history are still fair game.5 
As Siegel accurately states, 
Textualists believe that a statute’s passage through the constitutional 
process—the passage of the same statutory text by the two houses of 
Congress and either its signature by the President or the overriding of 
the President’s veto—imbues that text with legal force, regardless of what 
anyone intended and regardless of what purpose anyone tried to 
achieve.  Again, as the textualists put it, “[w]e do not inquire what the 
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”
6
 
The radicalization to which Siegel refers concerns some excep-
tional situations in which even ardent textualists have been willing to 
look beyond a statute’s language—until recently, that is.  When the 
legislature clearly has made a drafting error, or when a reading of a 
statute’s plain language would lead to an absurd result, even textualists 
have relied upon inferences as to legislative intent and have looked 
beyond statutory language.7  But these sensible limits on the text are 
coming to an end, Siegel argues.  They are coming to an end because 
textualists, influenced by scholars who have taken an extreme position 
on judges’ minimalist roles in interpreting statutes8 and finding com-
fort in judicial statements about the primacy of the text, have moved 
away from exercising judgment when the text is clear—even if this 
means knowingly thwarting legislative intent for the sake of promoting a 
formalistic methodology.  To use the title of Steven Smith’s article, the 
textualists are turning more and more to “[l]aw [w]ithout [m]ind.”9 
5 These factors are also fair game among intentionalists and purposivists.  For a 
discussion of the commonalities and differences among the various philosophies, see 
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30-43 (2006); 
Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 351-73 (2005); and Lawrence M. 
Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2027-30 (2005). 
6 Siegel, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Le-
gal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920)). 
7 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) (“[A]s 
far as civil trials are concerned, [Federal Rule of Evidence] 609(a)(1) ‘can’t mean what 
it says.’” (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987))).  Green is dis-
cussed in greater depth below.  See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
8 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 185-87 (2006) (ar-
guing that when a statute is clear, judges should not consult external sources, and that 
agency interpretations should be the only guide to ambiguous statutory language). 
9 Steven D. Smith, Correspondence, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 104 
(1989).  My thanks to Professor Bill Eskridge for discussion of this point. 
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Thus, Siegel gives a friendly scolding to those who criticize textual-
ism yet do not appreciate how far it has strayed from common sense.  
The recipients of this criticism are Caleb Nelson10 and Jonathan Mo-
lot,11 each of whom has written that textualism is unreasonable at the 
margins but that there is enough common ground between the tex-
tualists and everyone else for there to be some reciprocal learning at 
the very least.  Siegel calls such scholars “accommodationists”12 and 
suggests that, at least for now, their efforts at rapprochement are fu-
tile—in much the same way that Democrats criticize President Obama 
for caring too much about bringing Republicans into the fold. 
Siegel is certainly correct that Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Su-
preme Court has had sufficient influence on like-minded judges and 
scholars to inspire a body of quotable statements large enough to en-
able a judge bent on a formalist approach to write an opinion that ap-
pears lawlike and respectful of precedent, but that ignores the mod-
erating influences that Scalia himself accepts.  Yet, I do not share 
Siegel’s concern about textualism’s radicalization as a general matter, 
although he certainly makes his argument with telling illustrations.  
The most important reason not to believe that a radical form of tex-
tualism is gaining strength is that it is virtually impossible to be a true 
textualist on the ground.  It is easy enough to talk a good game, but 
when it comes to real cases, most judges will often enough subordi-
nate their bent toward formalism in favor of what they believe to be a 
result more consistent with the legislative will, the purpose of the sta-
tute (whether they mention it or not), their own political beliefs, oth-
er public law values, or some combination of the above. 
Let us examine a preradicalized example of textualism.  Consider 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Compa-
ny.13  The plaintiff, a prison inmate on work release, was operating a 
laundry machine when “[a] heavy rotating drum caught and tore off 
his right arm.”14  He sued in a products liability action.  At the time, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provided as follows: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited 
10 See Nelson, supra note 5, at 351-73 (arguing that differences in methodology be-
tween the two camps “might relate less to the basic goals of interpretation than to the 
assumptions and attitudes that interpreters bring to their common task”). 
11 See Molot, supra note 5, at 30-43 (“[T]extualism has had a measurable impact on 
judges and Justices who do not include themselves among textualism’s adherents.”). 
12 Siegel, supra note 1, at 125. 
13 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
14 Id. at 506 (majority opinion). 
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from the witness or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or impri-
sonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness 
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of ad-
mitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or 
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
15
 
Obviously, evidence of Green’s past crimes would be prejudicial and 
hardly relevant to the question whether the laundry machine was de-
fective.  But the Rule, as then written, contained an error:  it required 
only a finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudice to the defendant.16  Since the defendant was Bock Laundry, 
the Rule as written did not call for the prejudicial effect of the evi-
dence on Green to be taken into account. 
Not a single Supreme Court Justice took the position that the Rule 
should be applied literally.  Rather, the Justices argued either that the 
Rule should be construed to apply only to criminal defendants, there-
by allowing the evidence to be admitted against both sides in a civil lit-
igation, or that it should be applied to parties generally in both crimi-
nal and civil cases.  A majority of the Court took the former path, with 
Justice Scalia arguing in his concurrence that such an interpretation 
avoided an absurd result while causing less damage to the language of 
the Rule as written.  Justice Scalia’s interpretation required only that the 
word “defendant” be limited to a defendant in a criminal case.17 
Now compare Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Green to Judge By-
bee’s dissent in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Tran-
sit Services, Inc. (Amalgamated II),18 a 2006 case decided by the Ninth 
Circuit, which Siegel uses to illustrate the radicalization of textual-
ism.19  In a prior proceeding, Amalgamated I, a labor union had filed a 
class action against an employer in state court, and the employer’s ap-
plication to remove the case to federal court was granted.20  The Class 
15 FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1989). 
16 Siegel also wrote the leading article on legislative error.  See generally Jonathan R. 
Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 309, 310 (2001) (discussing how errors influence statutory interpreta-
tion, particularly weakening the textualist method). 
17 Green, 490 U.S. at 528-29 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
18 448 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
19 I will not discuss the other examples that Siegel cites, in part because of space 
limitations and in part because I do not find them as difficult to explain on grounds 
other than a pure commitment to textualism. 
20 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 435 F.3d 
1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)21 liberalizes removal and calls for 
removal decisions to be appealed as follows:  “A court of appeals may 
accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying 
a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it was 
removed if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days af-
ter entry of the order.”22 
The statutory language, however, makes no sense.  Relying on 
both legislative history and common sense, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the purpose of this provision was to limit the time for appeal so that a 
case can move forward expeditiously.23  Congress, however, mistakenly 
wrote “less” instead of “more” into the statute.24  Under a literal read-
ing, an appellant must wait one week and then can appeal at any time 
at all—forever.25 
The Ninth Circuit corrected the error.  This decision might have 
led to the union being out of luck since its application for appeal was 
properly filed more than seven days after entry of the order—within 
the literal language of the statute but outside the court’s interpreta-
tion.  The court, however, ruled that it would deem the procedures 
exercised by the appellant adequate by exercising the discretion 
granted it by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,26 thus render-
ing its decision to correct the statutory language prospective in na-
ture.27  As a result, the court enforced the intended meaning of the 
legislature without doing individual injustice in this particular case. 
A circuit judge asked that the matter be reheard en banc.28  The 
judges voted against this request, and Judge Bybee dissented from this 
decision in an opinion that Siegel regards as an example of radical 
textualism.29  Quoting precedent that itself relied on Caminetti v. Unit-
ed States,30 a 1917 Supreme Court decision, Judge Bybee wrote, 
21 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
22 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
23 Amalgamated I, 435 F.3d at 1145.  
24 Id. 
25 For a discussion of the debate between textualists and intentionalists with re-
spect to this CAFA provision, see Adam N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”?  Textualism, In-
tentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1187-89 (2007). 
26 FED. R. APP. P. 2. 
27 Amalgamated I, 435 F.3d at 1146-47. 
28 See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 
F.3d 1092, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006). 
29 Siegel, supra note 1, at 141.  
30 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
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[o]nce it recognized that the statute is unambiguous, the panel should 
have stopped, for it is a paramount principle of statutory construction 
that “[w]here[a statute’s] [sic] language is plain and admits of no more 
than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise, [sic] and 
the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”
31
 
For Judge Bybee, neither correction of a legislative error nor absurdity 
is an excuse for deviating from this rule, a departure from Justice Sca-
lia’s more temperate position illustrated above.  Moreover, had Judge 
Bybee prevailed, the same result would have been reached in this case, 
albeit through different means.  Thus, it appears that Judge Bybee in-
tended only to make a formalistic statement defending a mechanical 
version of textualism. 
With this as background, why do I not accept Siegel’s conclusion 
that Judge Bybee is an example of textualism gone radical?  For one 
thing, notwithstanding this opinion, Judge Bybee is not a textualist—
at least not consistently.  Consider the following excerpt from one of 
Judge Bybee’s statutory opinions examining the whistleblower provi-
sion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:32 
The plain language of this section, as well as the statute’s legislative history and 
case law interpreting it, suggest that to trigger the protections of the Act, 
an employee must also have (1) a subjective belief that the conduct be-




In a similar vein, Judge Bybee analyzed a provision of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act:34 
Finally, there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress specifical-
ly intended the courts to apply tolling principles to § 245(i).  Rather, the 
legislative history appears to recommend that the agencies responsible for 
enforcing the statute should accept petitions filed after the deadline in 
the exercise of their executive discretion.
35
 
In another context, Judge Bybee noted that “[n]othing in the statu-
tory language or legislative history of [42 U.S.C.] § 1981 even hints that Con-
gress wanted to exempt Native Hawaiian preferences from its provisions.  
31 Amalgamated II, 448 F.3d at 1096 (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485). 
32 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006). 
33 Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
34 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006). 
35 Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (first emphasis 
added). 
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Finding an exemption here is beyond any accepted method of statu-
tory interpretation.”36  In a habeas case interpreting a provision of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),37 
Judge Bybee argued in dissent that “[t]o rule otherwise is to ignore the clear 
congressional intent in AEDPA to curtail our second-guessing of state court 
habeas decisions.”38  In a case construing the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s 
statute of limitations,39 Judge Bybee noted in dissent that 
[t]he majority’s construction would frustrate these congressional purposes by 
permitting entities to obtain an individual’s credit report via misrepre-
sentation so long as no misrepresentation is made to the individual.  This 
behavior is fundamentally at odds with the congressional goals of avoiding im-
proper disclosures and respecting the consumer’s right to privacy.
40
 
When it suits him, Bybee is perfectly willing to look at legislative histo-
ry, intent, or statutory purpose—the hallmarks of an intentionalist or 
a purposivist.  This does not mean that Bybee generally prefers argu-
ments based on legislative history or legislative purpose to arguments 
based on statutory language or statutory structure.  But even when he 
examines statutory language, he sometimes sees it as the best evidence 
of legislative intent.  He does not use the text as the basis for a prin-
cipled rejection of legislative intent as irrelevant: 
We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that, had Congress in-
tended to restrict the [certificate of appealability] requirement for state 
detainees to petitions brought pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 2254, it would 




This is true of judges generally, textualist or otherwise.  In fact, 
Justice Scalia makes a standard textualist argument in Green in favor of 
interpreting statutes in a manner that will create coherence within the 
code, and he does so in intentionalist terms: 
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not 
on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by 
36 Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827, 879 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
37 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28 & 49 U.S.C.). 
38 Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) (Bybee, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2006). 
40 Williams v. County of Santa Barbara, 152 F. App’x 628, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (By-
bee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
41 Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).  For a 
similar example of Bybee’s willingness to look at legislative intent, see In re Digimarc 
Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of 
which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, 
and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress 
which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens sub-
ject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law in-
to which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility which, by a be-
nign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.
42
 
Notwithstanding his writings to the contrary, Justice Scalia uses cohe-
rence not as a value in its own right, but rather as a good proxy for intent 
(what Congress had in mind), the establishment of which is his goal. 
None of this should be too surprising.  As I have written else-
where, people understand the world by projecting the intentions of 
others onto their experiences.43  It is impossible to resolve an ambigui-
ty in language without asking what someone meant to say, and once 
one asks that question, one abandons the principal tenet of the tex-
tualist mission.  One can avoid doing this some of the time, especially 
when the language of a statute is both clear and consistent with the 
intended communicative content.  But when meaning is uncertain, or 
when the clear meaning is the result of an error or would lead to ab-
surdity, judges—including textualist judges—often speak in terms of 
the legislature’s intent. 
Thus, I, too, am an accommodationist in Siegel’s sense.  Like Mo-
lot and Nelson, I believe that the differences between the textualists 
and just about everyone else are not as great as the rhetoric might 
suggest.44  In particular, just about everyone who writes about statutory 
interpretation writes that legislative primacy is an important goal, at 
least most of the time; just about everyone believes that one should 
begin with the text of the statute; and just about everyone uses contex-
tual information, even if there is some disagreement about which con-
textual information is appropriate.45 
Returning to Judge Bybee’s dissent in Amalgamated II, how can we 
explain the opinion if he is not wedded to the methodology he es-
42 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (second emphasis added). 
43 See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws:  The Central Role of Legisla-
tive Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 450-51 (2005) (noting that mean-
ing is in large part influenced by our “conclusions about what is in the minds of others”). 
44 See Solan, supra note 5, at 2030 (“[T]extualist practice can internalize a great 
deal of contextual information while at the same time maintaining procedures less 
likely to lead courts into a decision-making process that conflicts with basic values such 
as separation of powers.”).  
45 See id. at 2028-30 (“[B]oth sides in the debate agree upon almost everything 
when it comes to statutory interpretation.”). 
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pouses?  Consider United States v. Locke,46 a case on which Bybee relies.  
In that case, Justice Thurgood Marshall (by no means a textualist), 
writing for the majority, held that a statutory deadline of “prior to De-
cember 31”47 for the registration of mining claims meant just that.48  A 
miner who snapped at the bait and filed his registration on the last 
day of the year did not comply with the statute and was subject to los-
ing his mine.  However, the Court remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings because it appeared that some government officials with 
whom the miners had been dealing made the same mistake and had 
misinformed the miners of the deadline.49  The government settled 
the case, giving the Locke family back their mine.50 
Judges weigh formalist values against other values all the time.  As 
Justice Marshall did in Locke, Judge Bybee found a vehicle for espous-
ing these values in a case in which he would do no harm to a fair out-
come, since he agreed with the result.  Thus, Bybee added to his tool-
kit without causing harm to any party when he dissented in 
Amalgamated II. 
Like Siegel, I do not think very highly of Bybee’s dissent.  Had he 
prevailed, future cases in the Ninth Circuit would have thwarted the 
will of Congress, unless Congress issued a technical correction.  But I 
do not think that the opinion presages an era of mindless adherence 
to accidents of language whatever the consequences. 
I agree with Siegel that a quarter century of textualism has made it 
easy for judges to employ the methodology opportunistically, whether 
or not they employ a radical version of it.  Empirical research has be-
gun to bear this claim out. James Brudney and Corey Ditslear, who 
looked at 632 “work law cases” that used one or another interpretive 
canon, found that there is a relationship between a Justice’s ideology 
and the strategic use of various interpretive devices.51  Both liberal and 
conservative judges make use of various canons, but liberal judges 
tend to use them for reaching liberal ends, and conservative judges 
46 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
47 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (2006). 
48 See Locke, 471 U.S. at 90 (noting that the required date of filing was “quite 
clear”). 
49 Id. at 89-90, 90 n.7. 
50 See Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits:  The Decline of Textualism in Statutory 
Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 242 (reporting information obtained through an inter-
view with Locke’s lawyer). 
51 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Search for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 57-60 (2005) (examining the linkage 
between ideology and the canons of construction employed).  
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tend to use them for reaching conservative ends.52  In another study, 
Brudney and Ditslear found that Justice Scalia is tougher on the use of 
legislative history to achieve liberal ends than he is when it is used to 
achieve conservative ends.53  Similarly, Stefanie Lindquist and Frank 
Cross found that judges pay less attention to precedent and more atten-
tion to their own values over time in their disposition of cases decided 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.54  And Miranda McGowan found Justice Scalia’s 
textualist approach used selectively in his dissenting opinions.55 
None of this makes these judges hypocrites.  Rather, it suggests 
that they are people with many values, which sometimes reinforce 
each other but at other times are at odds with each other.  Because 
loyalty to the enacted language can be but one such value, it is unlike-
ly that any judge will forsake all other values in the service of formal-
ism as a general matter.  Thus, I share Siegel’s response to the cases 
he discusses and express additional concern about the opportunistic 
use of textualist methods.56  But I do not believe these cases to 
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52 See id. at 59-60 (explaining that canons of construction “are more likely to be 
associated with liberal results in the hands of liberal judges and conservative results in 
the hands of conservative judges”). 
53 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative Histo-
ry:  Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 168 (2008) 
(describing the correlation between Scalia’s votes and the majority’s reliance on legis-
lative history). 
54 Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel 
Theory:  Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1200 (2005) (noting in-
creasingly proplaintiff decisions despite adverse precedent). 
55 Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say:  An Empirical Investigation of Justice 
Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 188 (2008) 
(describing Scalia as purposivist despite the teachings of the ordinary meaning 
theory). 
56 This concern is consistent with the legal realist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion being developed by Victoria Nourse.  See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Con-
gress:  Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 
99 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2011). 
